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In her book Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship Susan Col-
lins turns to Aristotle's political philosophy in search of answers to 
questions which contemporary liberalism cannot answer, or does 
not want to answer, concerning the demands the state makes of its 
citizens and the conflict between the good of the individual and the 
good of the state. The book is comprised of one rather long chap-
ter discussing liberalism and its contemporary critics and then five 
shorter chapters investigating Aristotelian moral and political phi-
losophy. The lessons for liberalism are not explicitly drawn and as a 
result the book feels quite disjointed, to the extent that it might be 
treated as two separate texts, in fact. One might also judge the two 
parts independently, in addition to the joint project of the whole. 
The first provides an insightful critique of liberalism, while the sec-
ond gives a provocative interpretation of the places in Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics and Politics where the virtue pursued by the indi-
vidual and the virtue prescribed by the state come into conflict. 
The starting point and motivation for the investigation is a 
critique of liberalism. Liberalism claims to allow each individual 
to define and pursue her own conception of the good and might 
pretend to make no demands on the individual. But critics of lib-
eralism argue that the individual and the state are interconnected 
more strongly than liberalism might allow: justice, for example, and 
its cousin tolerance, are required of all. Moreover, these virtues are 
required of liberal citizens not just as citizens, but as individuals. As 
Collins neatly puts it "public virtues do not suddenly become private 
vices, and in contrast to the self-aware pluralist or tolerant liberal, 
the pious believer and other such "absolutists" appear at the very 
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least naive" (p. 171). In this way, "[t]he inculcation of these [liberal] 
virtues inevitably raises the question of the good simply" (p. 37). 
With the question of the good simply the question of the lib-
eral order itself comes under renewed scrutiny. The presuppositions 
of the state are brought into view: "liberal justice assumes that the 
individual is of higher dignity or sanctity than the community ; . . . it 
judges free exchange and prosperity to be superior to cultural and 
religious habits it identifies individual labor . . . as compared 
to need or membership in a certain community, as the true ground 
of property" (p. 15). The primacy of the individual is itself, some-
what paradoxically, an injunction of the state and thus the state's 
values obscure its values from scrutiny. Thus Collins contends that it 
is difficult to ask questions about the liberal framework from within 
the framework itself and thus we must look elsewhere if we are to 
discuss them. Collins claims that "it is precisely because Aristotle 
does not share liberal presuppositions that his thought becomes use-
ful to us" (p. 166, cf. 2, 40) in solving, or at least addressing, the ten-
sion between individual and state. 
So we turn to Aristotle's political philosophy, as given in his 
Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter NE) and Politics (Pol.), which readily 
acknowledges that every regime educates its citizens either explic-
itly or implicitly, and so does not avoid the issues of individual good 
versus common good. Collins attempts to trace a continuous path 
through Aristotle's thought. In sequence, we move from various of 
the moral virtues (NE books 2, 3 and 4) to justice (NE 5) to the 
founding of the polis (Pol. 1) to the debate over the good of the polis 
(Pol. 7.1-3) to the debate over political authority (Pol. 3) to the life of 
leisure (Pol. 7-8) as illustrated by one of'social' moral virtues (in NE 
4). Collins depicts Aristotle as engaged in a discussion of how the 
political community "authorizes two ends for virtuous action that 
it also seeks to reconcile: the common good, on the one hand, and 
moral virtue or moral perfection in its own right, on the other" (p. 
45). In order to tackle this problem, Aristotle, as Collins tells the 
story, makes a series of attempts to slay a quarry that evades capture, 
moving from moral virtue to political virtue to intellectual virtue and 
cultural activity in search of an answer. At every stage, the tension 
between virtue as the good of the individual and virtue as the good 
of the community reasserts itself and, ultimately, resists resolution. 
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Collins begins by showing how the individual's pursuit of vari-
ous virtues can come into conflict with what the city puts forth as 
the proper exercise of the virtue. There is a dual meaning, Collins 
claims, to the virtue that the political community espouses for its 
citizens, in that when it establishes some activity as virtuous it is 
always pointing "beyond itself (p. 176). In aiming at the perfection 
of the citizens and in suggesting to them what they should pursue, 
the state opens itself up to the possibility that the citizens will go 
beyond the city's constraints in its espousal of it. On the one hand, 
it is noble to benefit the community even when such actions involve 
personal sacrifice. On the other hand, that the city establishes honors 
for brave deeds points the way to bravery for its own sake. This is first 
said of courage (p. 53). Courage is obviously beneficial to the city, 
but also dangerous because "the courageous man may seek to prove 
his virtue in less than politically prudent ways" (p. 56) . And Collins 
claims that in general, because virtuous activity requires resources 
and opportunities, virtue can tend toward tyranny, as the individual 
pursues his own virtue at the expense of other citizens (p. 59, 64) . 
In general, for Collins, nobility always involves some "self-for-
getting" (p. 53, 63, 173) on the part of the individual, even as the 
individual aims at the noble for the sake of his own virtue. There is 
always a sacrifice, whether it be of opportunities for ethically virtu-
ous action, or of person or property (liberality is described as involv-
ing a "loss" p. 58), or, as we shall see, of contemplation or culture or 
of opportunities for political exercises (when not actively in power). 
Collins is right to say that the means to virtue might be had at the 
expense of others (p. 58) but does not do much to explain how the 
longing for the noble gets out of hand. By highlighting the presence 
of the noble in the discussion and its sudden disappearance from the 
discussion of justice, Collins is perhaps arguing that the ethical vir-
tues have independent motive forces (such as might force a conflict 
with the good of the city). One might alternatively hold that action 
is only virtuous (for the individual) and aims at the noble if it con-
forms to what the city allows. There's no discussion of the nature of 
the non-rational part of the soul, of the longing or longings for the 
noble in virtuous actions, perhaps because Collins will find the vari-
ous mechanisms by which they might be curtailed—justice, practical 
wisdom and others—lacking, as we shall now see. 
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With this "dual" understanding of the noble in hand and having 
interpreted various of the ethical virtues accordingly, Collins natu-
rally moves (in Ch. 3) to justice, along with magnanimity, as the vir-
tues which offer a potential resolution of the tension between virtue 
as the good of the polis and virtue as the good of the individual. Jus-
tice, both general and particular, Collins claims, has its orientation 
toward others. As such, it places limits on the unrestrained exercise 
of various of the virtues which individuals do not otherwise have. 
However, our hopes for a resolution are unfulfilled, Collins main-
tains, for the mean demanded by justice is given by law, and since 
the law cares for the common advantage and not the good of the 
individual, justice cannot resolve the tension between the common 
and individual good. 
In order to maintain that justice does not resolve the tension in 
the state's espousal of moral virtue, Collins must oppose the idea 
that justice has its own specific other-directed impulse, such as the 
love of gain at the expense of others, (p. 77, p. 77 n. 14) Reject-
ing this position is important to her argument, since a pre- or at 
least non-political justice which is other-directed, threatens to cut 
off, almost by stipulation, any tension between one's own good and 
the good of the community. Her first argument to this effect is that 
there are other virtues which pertain to gain, so justice cannot be the 
proper perfection pertaining to gain. The "other virtue" mentioned 
is liberality. But liberality pertains to the dispensing of goods, not 
to their acquisition, and so there need not be any overlap. Another 
argument is that justice is relative to the regime. This will come as a 
great surprise to many, as it means that one might be just if one con-
forms to the edicts of a deviant regime. Collins relies on a quote from 
Aristotle to the effect that 'justice is not a mean' (NE 1134al, p. 76). 
However, Aristotle says only that justice is not a mean in the same 
way as the other virtues are means, which leaves much more room 
for maneuvering than Collins would suggest. Moreover, elsewhere 
Aristotle writes that "those who seek the just are seeking the mean" 
(Pol. 1287a32-b5; cited by Collins on p. 143.) 
While the law draws the limits to virtue in its own interest, it 
does decide what is equitable on the basis of merit, which is what is 
truly valuable (p. 84), even though it cannot allow unfettered pursuit 
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of what it points to as virtuous. Collins therefore moves (in Ch. 4) to 
an examination of the intellectual virtues in NE 6 and 10, both prac-
tical and theoretical wisdom, which in turn provide a bridge to the 
discussion of the good life for polis and individual in Pol. 1. 1-3. Next, 
since we as political scientists are examining how the human good is 
reflected in the law, and in particular in the structure of the regime 
itself, we are further brought (in Ch. 5) to an investigation of Pol 3. 
Here, Collins finds that virtue, (now including ruling) is still at odds 
with individual virtue, since politics requires being ruled, but being 
ruled requires refraining from exercising the virtue of practical wis-
dom in order to let others perform the activity (p. 115). Further, 
the political life is unfree, because it requires ruling for the sake of 
others (p. 129-30). And thirdly, that because each claim to political 
authority, including that of virtue, is partial, "no regime can accom-
modate the common advantage in the full sense" (p. 141). 
As a quasi-resolution to all of these clashes between individual 
and civic virtue, Collins suggests that the cultural activity suggested 
by the educational program of the Politics' best regime is a com-
promise of sorts, between the good of the individual and the polis, 
between political and philosophical activity (p. 116-7, 146). Such 
activity "manages to preserve the political community as a commu-
nity of free persons under the law and to redirect those most ambi-
tious with respect to virtue to higher and more self-sufficient action 
than those to which the political community on its own terms would 
point" (p. 117). 
Collins describes this life of leisure (from Pol. books 7 and 8) as a 
middle ground between the demands of the law and one's individual 
pursuit of virtue. By calling it a 'middle ground' Collins denies that 
this perspective resolves the tension between virtue as good for the 
polis and virtue as the good of the individual. Virtue in the form of 
philosophy still does not make peace with politics, since politics and 
philosophy compete for authority (p. 117) and politics is an impedi-
ment to philosophy (p. 146). Thus, Collins argues that the political 
community's authorization of justice (p. 95) or moral virtue (p. 98) 
as our perfection is in tension with the privileged position given in 
the life of the individual to theoria (contemplation) or liberal culture 
more generally. 
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Again, Collins does not, to my mind, adequately address compet-
ing positions. In this case, she does not mention the strategy discussed 
in the NE book 6, that practical wisdom makes provision for scien-
tific activity. In this way, in different senses, both practical wisdom 
and theoretical wisdom are "superior". This strategy can be seen tot 
be repeated concerning the polis in its relationship to cultural activ-
ity: intellectual culture might not help preserve the community, but 
it is nonetheless the goal of the community. Aristotle exploits the 
very difference between 'what the polis encourages or demands for 
the sake of the survival of the polis' and 'what the polis encourages 
or demands as the end of life' to settle any tension between the two. 
There's no need to posit an attitude that is at once respectful of 
the law yet superior to it if one holds that the law itself recognizes the 
superiority of culture. There need be no dispute between the law and 
either practical or theoretical wisdom on account of wisdom being 
an other authority (as Collins states on p. 117). There's no evidence 
for this. Even if we are talking about a gap between the law as written 
and as applied with the benefit of practical wisdom, the law needs 
guidance only insofar as it is not sufficiently specific. Wisdom is not 
a competing but a complementary source of authority. (See p. 87.) 
A critique such as this would also make the final chapter (Ch. 6) 
otiose. In it, Collins goes beyond even the cultural activity of the Poli-
ties' best regime and returns to the N£, and where before her claim 
was that the goals of the city and the individual could come into 
conflict, now she argues that two of the virtues of social interaction, 
tact and wittiness, combine to produce a Socratic, ironic or "comic" 
perspective that outstrips even the perspective of the best regime's 
educated citizen. The benefit of this perspective is that when we 
inhabit it, we appreciate both the need for political authority and 
yet realize its limits, so that neither do we despair in the face of the 
difficulties of political life nor rebel in the face of its authority. Being 
neither dogmatically committed to, nor alienated from the law, a 
"witty" attitude allows us to admit that the law is necessary without 
being captive to its seriousness. For the NE's social virtues of tact and 
wit Collins derives an answer of sorts to the quandary of the Politics. 
High-minded fanatics of virtue are quarantined within the walls of 
culture, where they might safely pursue their own internal activity, 
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while those with the requisite ironic distance can endorse its author-
ity even as they wrestle with its limitations. 
Collins is arguing is that, for Aristotle, virtue and politics, the 
good of the individual and that of society, are ultimately not recon-
cilable, except in the weak sense that irony can be construed as a 
virtue. Collins says that "irony acknowledges the power of our opin-
ions regarding what is noble and good even as it calls these opin-
ions into question." (p. 163) Socrates is the figure who embodies 
this position for Collins, but in the NE's discussion of truthfulness, 
Socrates is mentioned by name and his irony is not a virtue but an 
deficiency, in contrast to the straightforwardness of the intermedi-
ate person. What is a vice on one level is turned by Collins into a 
virtue at another, but there is no discussion of how to make this 
transformation and so Collins seems to have gotten made a misstep 
in her treatment of truthfulness. Perhaps, Collins feels that this trans-
formation of irony from vice to virtue cannot be said explicitly by 
Aristotle, as he values philosophy unrestricted by politics, but who 
is engaged in political philosophy for an audience of would-be politi-
cians. The rest of the chapter (Ch. 6) piles on a number of suggestive 
ideas and ends abruptly. 
Does this Aristotelian investigation show how liberalism might 
"defend its own moral and political principles"? (p. 7) . Aristotle does 
"address the question that is in principle left open by liberal thought: 
the question of the highest human good" (p. 2) and he shows us 
"the possibility that the best life consists in noble and just action in 
behalf of fellow citizens" (p. 173). Self-reflective liberals can thus 
learn from Aristotle that virtues—justice and tolerance in liberalism's 
case—are to be thought of as the highest good and the good of both 
state and individual, and that issues of various types will arise in "the 
relation between the right and the good" (p. 41). For example, Aris-
totle is said to provide "much-needed clarity about law as the vehicle 
by which human beings first come to know and seek the good" (p. 
174). Or again, that, since the question of whether the political good 
is the human good is not one that he can resolve, according to Col-
lins, so, neither can liberalism hope to resolve it. 
Such frank admissions of the state's influence and role might 
help liberalism face up to the realities of its own impositions. But 
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since liberalism's virtues are overtly other-directed, it is not clear 
what the initial discussion of the ethical virtues gains us. Or again, 
should liberalism handle the irresolvable tension in the same ways 
as Aristotle is purported to advise, directing its most ambitious citi-
zens towards philosophy and culture and encouraging (in others) 
the adoption of an ironic attitude? It's not clear. In general, the 
book cries out for a thorough exploration of what lessons liberalism 
should take from Aristotle in how it might justify itself, rather than 
merely that it must justify itself. As liberalism's interpreter of Aris-
totle, Collins is not interested in learning how a liberal state might 
justify to its citizens that they pursue courage or political activity or 
culture (though she does laud Aristotle's discussion, including the 
moral virtues, as revealing "the full meaning of citizenship" (p. 173).) 
In specifying and justifying its own vision of the good, the liberal 
state has no intention of heeding Aristotle's arguments for various 
components of the virtuous life, for this would change liberalism 
beyond recognition. 
The fact that Aristotle does not share our liberal presupposi-
tions might thus be as much an obstruction to such instruction as 
it is a blessing which makes him a source of applicable wisdom. At 
the least, it certainly necessitates a careful negotiation of the dis-
tance between Aristotle's political theory, and the presuppositions 
of Greek civic life, and liberalism's own way forward. Aristotle and 
the Rediscovery of Citizenship begins with an incisive critique of liberal-
ism's self-induced theoretical blindness and provides a provocative 
"non-resolved" interpretation of Aristotle's political philosophy, but 
does not clearly make good on its stated objective. 
